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Abstract 
We analyze the strategic decision of firms to voluntarily certify corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) practices in a context where other firms can falsely pretend to be 
socially responsible. Equilibrium outcomes are crucially determined by consumers' 
beliefs about the credibility of firms' CSR claims, which depend in turn on the 
(expected) fines for fraud. First, we show that an increase in such fines extends the 
likelihood of firms investing in CSR, at the expense of a reduced likelihood of 
certification. Second, fraud only arises when the fines for fraud are at intermediate 
levels and some CSR firms do not certify their practices. Third, the presence of fraud 
comes at a cost for firms by inducing lower equilibrium prices than in settings with 
honest marketing. Forth, the coexistence of fraud and certification induces 
differentiation price premia below marginal production costs and certification price 
premia above marginal certification costs. Lastly, social welfare rises as fines for fraud 
increase.    
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a mainstream business 
activity (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). It includes voluntary investments by firms 
to over-comply with social and environmental regulations that result often times in the 
provision of credence goods. The credence goods associated to CSR are product 
attributes difficult to judge even after purchase (Dulleck et al., 2011), and include 
characteristics of production, such as employment discrimination, "fair trade", and 
human rights (Baksi and Bose, 2007; Feddersen and Gilligan, 2001), or environmental 
aspects of products that consumers cannot observe directly, such as "Dolphin safe" tuna 
or genetically modified organism (Baksi and Bose, 2007; Harbaugh et al., 2011). This 
results in an asymmetric information problem between firms and consumers whereby 
miss-leading marketing (fraud) becomes an option (see Lyon and Maxwell, 2011 for a 
theoretical model of greenwash). Given the existence of fraud, firms' credibility among 
consumers is questioned, and makes certification an option to alleviate the asymmetric 
information problem. In fact, the use of certification of CSR is widespread; more than 
one third of large firms have voluntary external certifications for social and 
environmental standards (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). As an example, the 
Ecolabel index (www.ecolabelindex.com) is currently tracking 448 ecolabels in 197 
countries, and 25 industry sectors.  
Interestingly, still, many other firms base their CSR communication to the public 
on news releases and marketing campaigns without third-party validation. This is the 
case despite scandals for fraudulent marketing among non-certified firms are not rare. 
Recurrent examples are the advertisement as "sustainable energy sources" of major oil 
infrastructure (e.g. refineries) or extraction projects (e.g. oil platforms). The fact that 
firms continue to invest in marketing their CSR actions without certification suggests 
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that such claims have some information content for consumers that are worth the 
marketing investments. Empirical findings seem to support this view. For example, up 
to almost half of EU consumers self-report to trust completely or rather trust producers’ 
claims on their products' environmental performance (Commission, 2009).  
In sum, the coexistence of conventional (non-CSR) production, CSR practices, 
fraud and certification of CSR is present in many industries. To our knowledge, the 
combination of these issues has not been explored in the existing literature up to date, 
although we believe it has key effects on the likelihood of CSR practices and the 
associated mark-ups. In this context, we particularly focus on the role of the (expected) 
fines for fraud and their associated influence on consumers’ trust on firms’ claims. We 
show how these two related aspects affect (i) the likelihood of CSR practices and that of 
subsequent certification; (ii) the likelihood of fraud in the industry, and (iii) firms’ 
profits and social welfare.  
In terms of modeling, we treat firms engaging in CSR practices as producers of a 
high quality version of a product, while firms that use conventional practices are 
assumed to provide a standard (or low quality) version. We present an oligopoly model 
of vertical product differentiation where all consumers prefer the high- over the low-
quality version of the product for the same price.1 We assume that product quality is not 
directly observable by the consumers. As a result, firms can commit fraud about product 
quality and consumers form beliefs about the likelihood of honest behavior.  
Our model includes a broader strategy set for firms than the one usually 
considered in the literature, by combining two interacting dimensions. The first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Khanna (2001), Lyon and Maxwell (2008), Portney (2008), and more recently Kitzmueller and 
Shimshack (2012), present excellent reviews of the literature on motivations of firms to undertake CSR. 
In addition to the demand-driven efforts, which is the focus of this study, these papers include other 
motivations, such as incentives in employment contracts, "warm glow" preferences, social norms, and 
private (NGOs) and public politics. 
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dimension embraces the production technology, since firms can decide to produce either 
the high or the low quality version of the product. The second dimension addresses the 
marketing strategy. Firms producing the low quality version can fraudulently 
(truthfully) market their product to consumers as high (low) quality. In addition, firms 
producing the high quality version can decide to provide (or not) third-party validation 
through certification. Consumers’ equilibrium beliefs with regards to the validity of 
firms’ uncertified high-quality claims is the key element in the analysis, which crucially 
depends on the costs of producing high quality and the (expected) fines for fraud. 
We derive three main sets of results. The first has to do with the influence of the 
fines for fraud on the likelihood of CSR (high quality) production and subsequent 
certification. Everything else equal, increasing fines for fraud induces an increased 
likelihood of CSR production. Intuitively, sufficiently large fines deter firms producing 
the conventional product to commit fraud. This induces consumers to (consistently) 
believe that the uncertified firms that claim to offer CSR do so truthfully. The increased 
likelihood of CSR production comes at the cost of a decreased likelihood of 
certification. Given that consumers trust firms’ uncertified claims, certification has no 
influence in demand, as it does not provide any additional information. Conversely, 
widespread certification of CSR investments arises under low fines for fraud, where 
consumers do not trust firms’ claims at all.  
Second, we link fines for fraud with the likelihood of fraud in the industry. We 
show that fraud about firms' quality can only arise in settings with intermediate fines 
and where the conventional and the uncertified CSR versions coexist in the market. The 
key aspect is consumers’ imperfect trust on the uncertified variety. At the extreme case 
of large fines fraud does not arise, since fines are deterrent. But, surprisingly, fraud does 
not arise under low fines either. In this alternative scenario, firms producing the 
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conventional product are obviously tempted to cheat, but they anticipate that by doing 
so consumers will (consistently) believe that they are fraudulent. As a result, firms 
truthfully offering CSR need to engage in certification to stimulate demand, while firms 
offering the conventional product do not have incentives to commit fraud, as their 
claims would not be credible.  
The third set of results relates the fines for fraud with firms’ profits and social 
welfare.2 We find that the presence of fraud (which arises only under intermediate fines) 
induces (weakly) lower equilibrium prices of the different varieties for firms than in 
settings with honest marketing. As consumers’ trust is imperfect in the presence of 
(some) fraud, the equilibrium price for uncertified CSR is lower than in settings with 
perfect trust. This induces increased competition in the markets for conventional and 
certified CSR, reducing their respective prices. A related finding is that when the 
conventional product is available to consumers, the coexistence of fraud and 
certification induces a differentiation premium below the marginal cost of CSR, and a 
certification premium above the marginal certification cost. The former results from the 
strategic interaction between fraudulent and truthful firms, which reduces the expected 
willingness to pay for uncertified CSR. The latter is also derived from this uncertainty, 
providing an extra price premium for the certified version. Finally, we find that social 
welfare (weakly) increases when fines for fraud increase. This implies a first best 
scenario with large fines and no need for certification. A second best scenario is one 
with intermediate fines where (some) fraud may arise. We find that this scenario is 
socially preferred to an alternative one with low fines and no fraud where all CSR 
requires third-party validation. This result is interesting and may put the social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Previous scholarship has neglected for long the welfare effects of CSR (Lyon and Maxwell, 2008), with 
some exceptions (Baksi and Bose, 2007; Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003; García-Gallego and 
Georgantzís, 2011; Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero, 2002).	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desirability of public subsidies for promoting massive adherence to certification 
programs into question. 
In sum, our paper contributes to the literature on CSR by integrating self-
differentiation investments and certification decisions in a single modeling framework, 
which in turn requires explicitly modeling the role of the potential for fraud on firms' 
strategies and consumers' decisions. The related literature up to date has studied these 
two features on self-differentiation and certification separately.  
First, the literature focusing on incentives for self-differentiation (i.e., providing 
or not CSR) addresses the implications of production technology choices in markets 
where (at least a subset of) consumers value and can observe the CSR quality of 
products (e.g. Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Conrad, 2005). Choosing technology 
acts as product positioning, opening up for differentiation strategies for firms 
(Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). Substantial research efforts in these settings have 
addressed the interaction between the institutional context (taxes, subsidies and 
standards) with differentiation investments (Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003; Moraga-
González and Padrón-Fumero, 2002). More generally, previous theoretical contributions 
claim that CSR markets can be understood as contexts where consumers can choose to 
consume impure public goods (in particular, for green products) that generate both 
private and public features (Kotchen, 2005, 2006, 2013). However, this literature has 
not considered the credence good nature of voluntary abatement efforts by firms.3  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Dulleck et al. (2011) characterize the credence good literature in two separate streams. The first 
considers that consumers do not know what they need, but they observe the utility from what they get. 
The subjects of interest in this case are markets, such as those for doctors and mechanics, where 
undertreatment, overtreatment and overcharging are crucial forms of fraud (e.g. Emons, 1997). Dulleck 
and Kerschbamer (2006) presents an excellent review of this literature jointly with a model of credence 
goods that provides an unifying framework for the different market institutions and information structures 
on efficiency. The second stream of the credence goods literature is based on the definition that credence 
goods have qualities that are difficult to judge even after purchase. In this case, consumers know what 
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Second, the literature focusing on certification (i.e., providing or not third party 
validation of CSR) addresses the asymmetric information problem characterizing the 
credence nature of some voluntary efforts by firms (e.g. Amacher et al., 2004; Sedjo 
and Swallow, 2002). A central aspect of this literature is that firms producing 
conventional products have incentives to pretend to be CSR (i.e. cheat) and profit from 
consumers' higher willingness to pay, while saving the associated production costs. An 
implication is that in the absence of credible information disclosure mechanisms, 
consumers will not believe firms' claims about the quality of products, requiring the use 
of certification. Available strategies for firms are therefore to invest in CSR and certify 
their product or use conventional (non-CSR) production. Also in this stream of 
literature, substantial research efforts have tackled the interrelation between voluntary 
certification and the institutional context (Baron, 2011; Feddersen and Gilligan, 2001; 
Glachant and Moineville, 2012; Heyes and Maxwell, 2004). Additionally, this literature 
has explored the implications of imperfect certification processes in which errors can 
occur (Mason, 2006) and in contexts where these errors are noisy (Mason, 2011). Then, 
as well, consumers’ uncertainty about certification standards affect managerial decisions 
to have a product certified (Harbaugh et al., 2011). Baksi and Bose (2007) address the 
incentives for firms to deliberately misuse the labeling process to fraudulently sell their 
products as CSR. These authors compare the optimal monitoring policy by governments 
to deter fraud in equilibrium when the government imposes (forces non-voluntary) 
certification on low-quality firms, when it does so on high-quality firms, and when the 
low- and/or high-quality firms can self-differentiate their products. In Baksi and Bose, 
consumers' beliefs play no role, as monitoring by the government is intense enough to 
preclude the emergence of fraud in equilibrium. Glachant and Moineville (2012) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
they want but observe neither what they get nor the utility derived from what they get. In this paper, we 
adhere to the second definition.  
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address the influence of consumers' beliefs on firms' claims for self-differentiation, but 
still in settings in which labeling is not voluntary. In Baksi and Bose (2007), the 
government forces certification of production practices, while in Glachant and 
Moineville (2012), NGO's news releases on firms behavior are the certification to 
consumers. In sum, none of these previous studies allows firms to choose between 
uncertified and certified CSR investments, as the present study does. This is relevant 
because as Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) argue, the notion of "voluntary behavior" 
is critical in the definition of CSR.4  
We organize the remaining of the paper as follows. In the next section, we 
introduce the model. In Section 3, we present the characteristics of the equilibria 
configurations for different levels of the fines for fraud. In Section 4, we derive the 
implications of differences in fines on firms' production and marketing strategies, the 
emergence of fraud, equilibrium prices and social welfare. We conclude in Section 5. In 
the Appendix, we provide all the technical details. 
 
2. The model 
Suppose that a low (L) and a high (H) quality versions of a product are available 
in the market. We assume that each firm specializes in the production of either the low 
or the high quality version. All the consumers have the same willingness to pay for the 
low quality version, denoted as 𝜃 > 0, but they differ in their preferences for high 
quality. Let 𝜃! represent consumer j’s additional willingness to pay for the high quality 
version, which is uniformly distributed in the interval 0,1 .  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Some examples of famous voluntary certification programs are the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 




The product at hand presents credence good attributes and, therefore, it is 
impossible for consumers to distinguish between high and low quality even after 
purchase. Then, a firm producing the low quality version may be tempted to falsely 
market its product as high quality (𝐿!, where the subindex denotes the marketing 
strategy of the firm), aiming to capture additional consumer surplus, rather than 
truthfully market the product as low quality (𝐿!). Being aware of this, consumers form 
beliefs about the probability that an uncertified firm that claims to offer high quality 
actually does so, denoted as 𝛼 ∈ 0,1 . High quality can be guaranteed by a certification 
scheme5 and consequently firms producing the high quality version can either market it 
as high quality (𝐻!) or certified high quality (𝐻!). Since firms producing the high 
quality version do not have any incentive to market the product as low quality, 
consumers perfectly identify that a product marketed as low quality is indeed low 
quality.  
The product is supplied by a group of N firms. The number of firms following 
each strategy is represented by 𝑛!, 𝑖 = 𝐿! , 𝐿! ,𝐻! ,𝐻! , where 𝑛!! = 𝑁. For a firm of 
type 𝑖, profits are defined as: 𝜋! = 𝑞! 𝑝! −   ℎ! − 𝑐! − 𝑓! , 
where 𝑞! is the total amount of the good produced and sold by a firm of type i, 𝑝! is the 
per-unit price and ℎ! , 𝑐! , 𝑓!  are, respectively, the per-unit cost of producing the high 
quality version, the per-unit certification cost and the per-unit expected fine for fraud. 
Without loss of generality, the per-unit cost of producing the low quality version is zero. 
For low quality firms marketing the product as low quality ℎ!! = 𝑐!! = 𝑓!! = 0, for low 
quality firms falsely marketing the product as high quality ℎ!! = 𝑐!! = 0, 𝑓!! = 𝑓, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  We abstract from mistakes in the certification process addressed in Mason (2006; 2011) and 
consequently we assume that certification is a true signal of high quality.  
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high quality firms marketing the product as high quality ℎ!! = ℎ, 𝑐!! = 𝑓!! = 0, and 
for high quality firms marketing the product as certified high quality ℎ!! = ℎ, 𝑐!! = 𝑐, 𝑓!! = 0.	  
Therefore, there are four possible combinations of production and marketing 
strategies for the firms. However, consumers can only distinguish among the three 
marketed varieties, namely low, uncertified high, and certified high quality. In the 
process of deciding their production and marketing strategies, firms consider the 
consumers’ surplus associated with each marketed variety. Consumers’ surplus for the 
low quality version is simply the difference between the corresponding willingness to 
pay 𝜃 and the price of the product 𝑝!!. Next, perfect credibility with regards to the 
certifying party ensures that consumers identify a certified high quality product as high 
quality. Then, consumer j’s surplus is the difference between the willingness to pay in 
this case, 𝜃 + 𝜃!, and the price 𝑝!!. However, consumers cannot distinguish between 
fraudulent high quality (𝐿!) and truthful high quality (𝐻!), since both varieties are 
presented to the market as high quality and none is certified. In this case, consumers 
believe that the probability that the product is truly high quality is ∝. Assuming risk 
neutrality, consumer j’s expected surplus is the difference between the expected 
willingness to pay (i.e., ∝ 𝑈 + 𝜃! + 1−∝ 𝑈 = 𝑈+∝ 𝜃!) and the corresponding price 
(𝑝!! = 𝑝!!).  
We assume that firms first decide the variety they produce, being a combination 
of the quality of the product and the marketing strategy, and then compete á la Cournot. 
The relevant equilibrium concept to solve this game with incomplete information is the 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). In this equilibrium, the 
strategies of the players are optimal for given beliefs and strategies of the other players. 
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In turn, beliefs on the equilibrium path are updated from observed actions according to 
Bayes’ rule, while beliefs off the equilibrium path are updated according to Bayes’ rule 
where possible.  
 
3. Equilibria configurations   
In this section, we characterize the different equilibria configurations, including 
the equilibrium prices, price premia, and the number of firms adopting each possible 
strategy. Two different price premia are relevant in this context, namely the 
differentiation and the certification price premia for the uncertified and certified high 
quality versions of the product, respectively. The former refers to the difference 
between the equilibrium prices of the uncertified high and the low quality versions, 
while the latter reflects the difference between certified and uncertified high quality 
prices. A complete characterization of all the possible types of equilibria can be found 
in the Appendix.  
Three different scenarios that depend on the magnitude of the fines for fraud are 
relevant in studying the characteristics of the equilibria configurations. We refer to these 
three cases as of large, low and intermediate fines, respectively. We present the intuitive 
case of large fines in the first place. 
3.1. Large fines for fraud 
In this case, the per-unit expected fine for fraud is larger than the marginal cost 
of producing high quality (𝑓 > ℎ). Proposition 1 presents the characteristics of a 
heterogeneous equilibrium where both the low and the high quality versions of the 
product can coexist in the market. 
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Proposition 1. If 𝑓 > ℎ , both the low and the high quality versions of the 
product can coexist in equilibrium (LLHH). All firms producing low quality market the 
product as low quality (i.e., there is no fraud) and no firm offering high quality engages 
in certification. The respective equilibrium prices and number of firms pursuing each 
strategy are 𝑝!! = 1𝑁, 𝑝!! = 1𝑁 + ℎ, 𝑛!! = ℎ𝑁 and 𝑛!! = 1 − ℎ 𝑁.  
Intuitively, if the expected fine is large enough to restrain firms producing the 
low quality version to commit fraud, all consumers (consistently) believe that the 
uncertified firms that claim to offer the high quality version do so truthfully (that is, 
consumers’ belief in equilibrium is α∗ = 1). In this case, the (expected) willingness to 
pay for the uncertified high quality and the certified varieties coincide. Thus, 
certification has no influence in the demand, as it does not provide any additional 
information.  
In terms of the number of firms following each strategy, the larger the marginal 
cost of producing high quality, the smaller the number of firms offering high quality. 
Consequently, the larger is the number of firms supplying low quality. In addition, the 
price of the low quality version is independent of the marginal cost of producing high 
quality (ℎ), while the price of the high quality variety positively depends on such cost. 
Indeed, the differentiation price premium coincides exactly with the additional marginal 
cost of producing the high quality version (ℎ).6  
Finally, the likelihood of the equilibrium configuration LLHH also depends on ℎ 
being small enough. The explanation is as follows. The indifferent consumer between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The equilibrium price of the low quality variety is independent of h due to two opposing effects that 
exactly compensate one for the other. On the one hand, the price of the low quality variety increases when ℎ increases as a result of the interdependence with the price of the high quality version through the best 
response equation (see the Appendix for details). On the other hand, the number of firms offering the low 
quality version in equilibrium increases when ℎ increases and therefore, competition in the market for the 
low quality variety increases, which reduces the corresponding price. 
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the low and the uncertified high quality varieties is simply 𝜃!" = p!! − p!! = ℎ.7 
Then, consumers with an additional willingness to pay for high quality lower than ℎ 
purchase the low quality version, while consumers with an additional willingness to pay 
for high quality larger than ℎ purchase the high quality version of the product. Thus, the 
heterogeneous equilibrium where the two versions of the product are offered exists as 
long as the indifferent consumer is within the feasible range, 𝜃! ∈ 0,1 . Since ℎ > 0, 
the critical condition in defining the existence of the heterogeneous equilibrium is 𝜃!" < 1, which therefore implies ℎ < 1. Intuitively, firms producing the low and the 
high quality versions of the product coexist in the market as long as there are consumers 
with an additional willingness to pay for high quality larger than the additional marginal 
production cost. Otherwise, all the firms supply the low quality version of the product, 
at the equilibrium price 𝑝!! = 1𝑁. 
3.2. Low fines for fraud 
In this case, the per-unit expected fine for fraud is smaller than the marginal cost 
of producing the high quality version (𝑓 < ℎ). Both the low and the high quality 
versions can coexist in the market as well, but now all the firms offering the high 
quality version must certify their product to signal high quality. The details of the 
heterogeneous equilibrium in this case are presented next. 
Proposition 2. If 𝑓 < ℎ , both the low and the high quality versions of the 
product can coexist in equilibrium (LLHC). All the firms producing low quality market 
the product as low quality (i.e., there is no fraud) and all the firms offering high quality 
certify their product. The respective equilibrium prices and number of firms pursuing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The corresponding consumer j’s surpluses for the low and the high quality varieties are, respectively, 𝜃 − 𝑝!! and 𝜃 + 𝜃! − 𝑝!!.	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each strategy are 𝑝!! = !! , 𝑝!! = !! + ℎ + 𝑐 , 𝑛!! = (ℎ + 𝑐)𝑁  and 𝑛!! = 1− ℎ −𝑐 𝑁.  
Surprisingly, no firm offering the low quality version of the product engages in 
fraudulent marketing in equilibrium, even when the expected fine for fraud is very low. 
The reason is that consumers' beliefs are endogenous and updated in a Bayesian way. 
Firms producing the low quality version are obviously tempted to falsely market their 
product as high quality but they anticipate than by doing so all consumers will 
(consistently) believe that uncertified firms that claim to offer the high quality version 
are fraudulent. Therefore, the equilibrium consumers’ belief is α∗ = 0 and uncertified 
claims cannot stimulate demand. In fact, under α∗ = 0, the expected willingness to pay 
for the low and the uncertified high quality varieties coincide. Consequently, the firms 
offering the high quality version need to certify their product to truthfully signal that 
they are producing high quality.8  
The explanation of the characteristics of this equilibrium is analogous to the 
previous case under large fines. The only difference is that now, the price of the high 
quality version depends on ℎ + 𝑐, that is, the sum of the marginal cost of producing 
high quality and the per-unit cost of certification. Then, the price premium for the 
certified high quality version, which includes both the differentiation and certification 
price premia, is exactly ℎ + 𝑐. Since the mathematical expression for the indifferent 
consumer between the low and the certified high quality varieties is 𝜃!" = p!! − p!! =ℎ + 𝑐, , the heterogeneous equilibrium where the two versions of the product are offered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Note that the belief ∝∗= 0 is off the equilibrium path, but anyway needed to sustain the equilibrium 
configuration where firms producing the low quality version never commit fraud and firms producing the 
high quality version always engage in certification. 
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exists as long as ℎ + 𝑐 < 1. Notice thus that with low fines the range of production 
costs for which firms produce high quality shrinks.  
3.3. Intermediate fines for fraud 
In this last scenario, the per-unit expected fine for fraud equals the marginal cost 
of producing the high quality version (𝑓 = ℎ).9 Again, the low and the high quality 
versions of the product can coexist as well, but now in some equilibria firms producing 
the low quality version commit fraud. The emergence of fraud depends on the 
marketing strategy selected by the firms producing the high quality version. The 
following proposition presents all the possible heterogeneous equilibrium 
configurations. 
 Proposition 3. If 𝑓 = ℎ, both the low and the high quality versions of the 
product can coexist in equilibrium. Several equilibrium configurations arise in this 
case: 
(i) LLHC: All the firms producing low quality market the product as low 
quality (i.e., there is no fraud), while all the firms offering high quality 
certify their product. The respective equilibrium prices and number of 
firms pursuing each strategy are 𝑝!! = 1𝑁 , 𝑝!! = 1𝑁 + ℎ + 𝑐 , 𝑛!! = (ℎ +𝑐)𝑁 and 𝑛!! = 1 − ℎ − 𝑐 𝑁.  
(ii) LLLHHH: Some firms producing low quality fraudulently market their 
product as high quality, while no firm producing high quality engages in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 We could alternatively assume that consumers are uncertain about the exact level of the expected fine 
for fraud (maybe because this fine depends on the probability of being caught, which might have a 
subjective component on the part of the firms), but they know that such an expected fine belongs to an 
interval [𝑓, 𝑓], 𝑓 < 𝑓. Then, a scenario of large fines would be such that ℎ < 𝑓, intermediate fines would 
be such that ℎ ∈ [𝑓, 𝑓] and, finally, low fines would be characterized by  ℎ > 𝑓. The main results of the 
paper remain valid under this alternative specification. 
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certification. The respective equilibrium prices and number of firms 
pursuing each strategy are 𝑝!! = ∝∗𝑁 , 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = ∝∗𝑁 + ℎ , 𝑛!! = ℎ𝑁∝∗ , 𝑛!! = (1−∝∗) ∝∗−ℎ 𝑁∝∗  and 𝑛!! = ∝∗− ℎ 𝑁, where ∝∗= (0,1).  
(iii) LLLHHHHC: Some firms producing low quality fraudulently market their 
product as high quality, while some firms producing high quality engage 
in certification. The respective equilibrium prices and number of firms 
pursuing each strategy are 𝑝!! =
! !!∝∗ !/!!∝∗!! !! ∝∗!(∝∗)!/! !(∝∗)!/! !!∝∗!!∝∗ !/!∙ !!!!! !!∝∗ !/!!(∝∗)!/! , 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = 1 −∝∗ !/!𝑝!! + ℎ , 
𝑝!! = !!∝∗∝∗ !/! 𝑝!! + ℎ + 𝑐 , 𝑛!! = !!!! + 1 −∝∗ !/! − 1 ,   𝑛!! = (1 −∝∗) ∝∗ !!! !!!!! !!∝∗ !/! + (∝∗)!/! + 1 −∝∗ !/! − 1 , 𝑛!! =∝∗ ∝∗ !!! !!!!! !!∝∗ !/! +(∝∗)!/! + 1 −∝∗ !/! − 1 and 𝑛!! = (∝∗)!/!(!!∝∗!!)!!! !!∝∗ !/! + (∝∗)!/! − 1 , where ∝∗= (0,1).  
(iv) LHHH: All the firms producing low quality fraudulently market their 
product as high quality, while no firm producing high quality engages in 
certification. The respective equilibrium prices and number of firms 
pursuing each strategy are 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = !!∝∗! + ℎ ,   𝑛!! = (1 −∝∗)𝑁  and 𝑛!! =∝∗ 𝑁, where ∝∗= (0,1).  
(v) LHHHHC: All the firms producing low quality fraudulently market their 
product as high quality, while some firms producing high quality engage 
in certification. The respective equilibrium prices and number of firms 




In contrast with the two scenarios of large and low fines presented in 
Propositions 1 and 2 above, the present scenario is compatible with any consumers’ 
belief in equilibrium, ∝∗∈ (0,1), and this opens up for the existence of all possible 
combinations of firms' strategies. In particular, the three marketing strategies (low, high 
and certified high quality) can coexist in this scenario (case iii of Proposition 3 
characterizes this situation). Equilibrium LLHC (case i) is the only one in which firms 
producing low quality do not commit any fraud. In this case, all the firms producing 
high quality engage in certification, which is incompatible with the presence of low 
quality firms committing fraud. Therefore the resulting equilibrium prices and number 
of firms following each strategy in case (i) are the same as those presented in 
Proposition 2. However, in cases (ii) – (v), some or even all the firms producing low 
quality fraudulently market their product as high quality. The key aspect that allows for 
this fact is the existence of firms producing high quality that do not certify their product.  
Case (ii) in Proposition 3, equilibrium LLLHHH with no certification and with 
fraud from low quality firms, is similar in spirit to the one presented in Proposition 1, 
where no firm producing high quality engages in certification. The difference now is 
that, under risk neutrality, firms are indeed indifferent between producing the 
uncertified high quality version of the product or producing the low quality version and 
risking an expected penalty for fraud. Therefore, any consumers’ belief is compatible in 
equilibrium, that is, ∝∗∈ (0,1). The equilibrium prices and number of firms following 
each strategy depend on the equilibrium consumers’ belief. The lower the consumers’ 
expectation ∝∗, the lower the prices of both the low and the (uncertified) high quality 
versions of the product. The reason is that consumers’ additional (expected) willingness 
to pay for high quality is increasing in ∝, and the prices of the low and the high quality 
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varieties are positively correlated through the best response equation (see the Appendix 
for details).     
Interestingly, the equilibrium LLLHHHHC with high and low quality, fraud and 
certification (case iii of Proposition 3) presents idiosyncratic characteristics. In this case, 
the three marketing strategies (low, high and certified high quality) coexist in 
equilibrium. Also, some firms producing the low quality version find it optimal 
fraudulently market the product as high quality. As opposed to the cases previously 
analyzed, in this case the prices of all three varieties depend on the marginal cost of 
producing high quality and the marginal certification cost, since the prices of the three 
varieties interact through the respective best response equations. 10  Regarding the 
number of firms following the different strategies, the effect of h on n!!, 𝑛!! or 𝑛!! is 
uncertain, but the corresponding effect 𝑛!!  is unambiguously negative for any ∝∗∈ (0,1) . The higher the level of trust of consumers, the lower is the use of 
certification. The per-unit certification cost 𝑐 also affects the equilibrium number of 
firms following each possible strategy. This effect is unambiguously positive on 𝑛!!, 𝑛!! and 𝑛!! for any ∝∗∈ (0,1) and, therefore, negative for 𝑛!!, as expected. 
Next, in equilibrium LHHH (case iv of Proposition 3) all the firms market their 
product as high quality without certification. Consumers do not observe any production 
quality differences, but all the firms that produce the low quality version falsely market 
the product as high quality. The number of firms following the fraudulent strategy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Specifically, the prices of the low and the uncertified high quality varieties are increasing in the 
marginal cost of producing high quality (since 1 −∝∗ !/! +∝∗− 1 > 0  for any ∝∗∈ (0,1) ) and 
decreasing in the marginal certification cost (since ∝∗− (∝∗)!/! < 0 for any ∝∗∈ (0,1)). On the contrary, 
the price of the certified high quality variety is increasing in both marginal costs (the latter is due to the 
fact that the term ∝∗!(∝∗)!/!!!∝∗ !/!∙ !!!!! !!∝∗ !/!!(∝∗)!/!  is negative but smaller than one in absolute value for 
any ∝∗∈ (0,1)).	  
19	  
	  
crucially depends on the consumers’ equilibrium belief, ∝∗and, again, any ∝∗∈ (0,1) is 
compatible in equilibrium.  
Finally, in equilibrium LHHHHC (case v of Proposition 3) all firms producing the 
low quality version commit fraud and market their product as high quality. In this case, 
uncertified and certified high quality coexist as the only marketing strategies. 
Interestingly, the consumers’ equilibrium belief ∝∗negatively affects the price of both 
uncertified and certified high quality. Also, as expected, the prices of both varieties 
positively depend on the marginal cost of producing high quality, ℎ, while the marginal 
certification cost only affects the certified high quality version of the product. Finally, 
this certification cost (and not the marginal cost of producing high quality) has a crucial 
effect on the number of firms following each strategy. The effect of the certification 
cost on 𝑛!! and 𝑛!! is positive, while the corresponding effect on 𝑛!! is negative.  
Next, we analyze the conditions for the existence of each type of equilibrium 
configuration (see the Appendix for a detailed mathematical characterization of such 
conditions). Here, we illustrate the likelihood of each type of equilibrium by means of 
Figure 1. This figure represents, in the space of (ℎ, 𝑐) combinations, the areas in which 
each possible type of equilibrium arises.11, 12 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Since in this case we are assuming that ℎ = 𝑓, every time we consider a change in ℎ, an associated 
change of the same magnitude and sign is assumed with regards to 𝑓. This strategy allows us to analyze 
the effect of the value of ℎ on the likelihood of each type of equilibrium configuration within the situation 
of intermediate fines. The comparison of the three ranges of the fines (which is possible only when we 
consider a change in ℎ keeping 𝑓 fixed) is postponed for the next section.  
12 The line 𝜃!" = 1 defines the set of combinations (ℎ, 𝑐) such that the indifferent consumer between 
uncertified and certified high quality has an additional willingness to pay for certified high quality of 1. 
Also, the line 𝜃!" = 𝜃!"  defines the set of combinations (ℎ, 𝑐) such that the indifferent consumer 
between low and uncertified high quality and the indifferent consumer between uncertified and certified 
high quality coincide. Finally, the line 𝜃!" = 0 defines the set of combinations (ℎ, 𝑐) such that the 
indifferent consumer between low and uncertified high quality has an additional willingness to pay for 
high quality of zero. 
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As expected, in settings with large marginal costs of producing high quality and 
certification costs (i.e., large ℎ and 𝑐), only firms producing the low quality version 
exist in equilibrium (area 𝐿! in Figure 1). As ℎ decreases (horizontal movement towards 
the vertical axis in Figure 1), it becomes possible for firms offering the low and high 
quality versions to coexist. Depending on the ratio of h to c, there can be low and 
certified high quality firms coexisting (case i, area 𝐿!𝐻!) low and uncertified high 
quality firms coexisting (case ii, area𝐿!𝐿!𝐻!), or even the three marketing strategies 
coexisting (case iii, area 𝐿!𝐿!𝐻!𝐻!). If ℎ is small enough as compared with 𝑐 (bottom 
left region of Figure 1), it is even possible that no firm markets its product as low 
quality, and only uncertified high quality is offered in the market (case iv, area 𝐿!𝐻!) 
or uncertified and certified high quality with some fraud (case v, area 𝐿!𝐻!𝐻!). The 
configuration of equilibria in Figure 1 is highly dependent on the number of firms in the 
industry (𝑁). Figure 2 presents the likelihood of each possible equilibrium configuration 
for a large number of firms.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
By comparing Figures 1 and 2, the first thing we notice is that area 𝐿! remains 
the same in both figures. This means that the likelihood of high quality production 
(being or not certified, and being or not truthful) is independent of the number of firms 
in the industry. Also, we can see that the line 𝜃!" = 1 has pivoted down in Figure 2, 
while the line 𝜃!" = 𝜃!"  has pivoted up. In fact, it can be easily shown that as the 
number of competing firms increases, areas 𝐿!𝐻! and 𝐿!𝐻!𝐻!  tend to disappear, since 
the line 𝜃!" = 0 shifts to the left to eventually collapse to the vertical axis as 𝑁 
increases. This means that when the number of firms in the industry is large enough, 
there is always a subset of firms producing and marketing the low quality version of the 
21	  
	  
product. Note that the likelihood of fraud decreases when the number of firms in the 
industry increases (put differently, the sum of areas 𝐿! and 𝐿!𝐻!  is larger in Figure 2 
than in Figure 1). Also, certified high quality is less likely when the size of the industry 
increases (the sum of areas 𝐿!𝐻! , 𝐿!𝐻!𝐻!  and 𝐿!𝐿!𝐻!𝐻!  in Figure 1 is larger than the 
sum of areas 𝐿!𝐻!  and 𝐿!𝐿!𝐻!𝐻!  in Figure 2). 
Finally, the likelihood of the corresponding equilibrium configurations also 
depends on the consumers’ equilibrium belief, ∝∗. For example, in Figure 113, the area 𝐿!𝐿!𝐻! decreases if ∝∗ decreases (ℎ =∝∗ moves to the left and 𝑐 = 1−∝∗ moves up) 
while the area 𝐿!𝐻!  increases (ℎ =∝∗ moves to the left and θLH=θHC, or equivalentely 𝑐 = !!∝∗∝∗ ℎ, pivots to the left). Therefore, the set of combinations (ℎ, 𝑐) under which 
certified high quality arises clearly increases when ∝∗ decreases. The likelihood of the 
coexistence of the three marketing strategies and fraud (or area 𝐿!𝐿!𝐻!𝐻! ) is 
maximized when ∝∗= 1/2.  
 
4. How do (expeted) fines for fraud affect equilibrium outcomes? 
In this section, we analyze the differences between the three ranges of the fines 
for fraud studied in the previous section with regards to the properties of the different 
types of equilibria. In particular, we analyze differences with regards to the likelihood 
of high quality production and certification, the likelihood of fraud, the resulting prices 
and price premia, and the social welfare levels.  
Figure 3 compares the configuration of equilibria for the three cases of low, 
intermediate and large fines, respectively. The grey areas represent the presence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




certified high quality, while the dotted areas represent the presence of uncertified high 
quality. Uncertified and certified high quality coexist only in the case of intermediate 
fines, which is illustrated by the dotted-grey areas. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
It is easy to see that the likelihood of certified high quality (grey area) decreases 
as fines for fraud increase. Certification occurs for a broader combination of high 
quality production cost and certification costs in the case of low fines, shrinks for 
intermediate fines, to eventually disappear under large fines. This result has to do with 
the fact that, in equilibrium, consumers’ beliefs on firms' claims are increasing in the 
level of the fines (∝∗= 0  in the case of low fines, ∝∗∈ (0,1) in the intermediate case, 
and ∝∗= 1 in the case of large fines). As consumers’ trust on uncertified claims 
increase, their additional willingness to pay for the certified version decreases. At the 
same time, higher consumers’ trust on uncertified claims increases the presence of 
uncertified high quality (note that the dotted area is the largest under large fines, or 
complete trust, and it disappears under low fines, or nil trust). The reason is that 
consumers’ additional willingness to pay for uncertified high quality, as compared to 
the low quality variety, increases as ∝∗ increases.  
Combining these two effects, the production of high quality, being certified or 
not (and represented by the sum of the dark grey and dotted areas) is maximized in the 
case of large fines for fraud. Although certification is absent in this case, consumers’ 
additional willingness to pay for the high quality version (relative to the low quality 
one) is the largest. Thus, firms have the largest incentive to produce high quality; not 
only consumers’ additional willingness to pay is the largest but also production costs 
include only quality costs ℎ and no certification costs. Conversely, in the case where 
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fines for fraud are low, the presence of certification practices is the largest, although this 
does not imply a larger likelihood of high quality production over all.14 
All this analysis is summarized in the following: 
Result 1. As the fines for fraud increase, the range of parameter values for 
which there are firms supplying the high quality version of the product increases, at the 
expense of decreasing certification. 
We now analyze the link between the level of the fines and the presence of fraud 
in the industry. Figure 4 compares the three cases of low, intermediate and large fines. 
Shadowed areas represent equilibria configurations where fraud exists in equilibrium.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Under large fines, firms have no incentives to commit fraud, since the expected 
fine for fraud is larger than the additional marginal cost of producing high quality. This 
induces consumers to completely trust firms’ claims (∝∗= 1). In the opposite case of 
low fines, firms do not commit fraud either, but the explanation is completely different. 
In this situation, all the firms producing the low quality version are tempted to commit 
fraud, since the expected fine for fraud is lower than the additional marginal cost of 
producing high quality. But consumers anticipate these incentives and will therefore 
form the belief that no firm offering uncertified high quality is to be trusted (∝∗= 0). As 
a result, firms producing high quality need to engage in certification to credibly signal 
high quality.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The reader can easily check that all this analysis remains valid when the number of firms in the industry 
is large enough. Figures 3a and 3c are independent of 𝑁, while Figure 3b has to be appropriately updated 
according to Figure 2. 
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Fraud is then only possible in the intermediate case, where consumers’ 
equilibrium level of trust on uncertified varieties can be anywhere between 0 and 1. For 
intermediate fines, fraud is present in all equilibrium configurations except in the areas 𝐿! and 𝐿!𝐻! . In the shadowed area of Figure 4, the marginal cost of producing high 
quality is large enough relative to the marginal cost of certification as for fraud to 
emerge. These results regarding fraud are then summarized next. 
Result 2. Fraud can only arise under intermediate fines. The key features that 
make fraud likely are the existence of firms producing uncertified high quality in 
equilibrium and less than complete consumers’ trust on the quality claims of firms. 
Next, we analyze the impact of the level of fines for fraud on the equilibrium 
prices. The interesting cases to study are the combinations of (h,c) that result in 
different equilibria depending on the level of the fines. These areas can be identified by 
comparing the different panels in figures 3 and 4.15  
The equilibrium price for the uncertified high quality version of the product is 
(weakly) lower with intermediate fines than with either of the other two extremes fines 
for fraud. The scenario of intermediate fines is the only one where fraud is possible and 
consequently consumers’ level of trust for uncertified high quality is not complete. This 
results in a lower willingness to pay for uncertified high quality as compared to the 
situation of large fines. This in turn induces a decrease in the number of firms offering 
uncertified high quality and the corresponding increase in the number of firms offering 
either the low or the certified high quality versions. The result is increased competition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 We find five relevant combinations of equilibrium configurations, depending on the parameters (h,c). 
Each configuration combination is characterized by the configuration of the low, intermediate and large 
fines, respectively. The relevant combinations are: (i) 𝐿!𝐻! −   𝐿!𝐻! −   𝐿!𝐻!; (ii) 𝐿!𝐻! −   𝐿!𝐿!𝐻! −  𝐿!𝐻! ; (iii) 𝐿!𝐻! −   𝐿!𝐿!𝐻!𝐻! −   𝐿!𝐻! ; (iv) 𝐿!𝐻! −   𝐿!𝐻! −   𝐿!𝐻! ; and, finally, (v) 𝐿!𝐻! −𝐿!𝐻!𝐻! −   𝐿!𝐻!. The two last cases are not possible when 𝑁 is large enough. 
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in both markets, reducing the respective prices. Result 3 now summarizes this finding. 
(A complete proof of this result is offered in the Appendix.)  
Result 3. The equilibrium prices of the different varieties of the product in the 
case of intermediate fines are weakly lower than the corresponding prices of the 
different marketed varieties under large and low fines.  
Now, we compare the respective price premia in the three scenarios of low, 
intermediate and large fines. A direct comparison of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 shows that 
the respective differentiation and certification premia are in most settings the additional 
marginal cost of producing high quality (ℎ) and the per-unit certification cost (𝑐), 
respectively. A remarkable exception is equilibrium LLLHHHHC for intermediate fines. 
There, the differentiation premium (𝑝!! − 𝑝!!) is below the marginal cost of producing 
high quality (h), while the certification premium (𝑝!! − 𝑝!!) is above the marginal 
certification fee (c). 16  This result illustrates that the strategic interaction between 
fraudulent and trustworthy products marketed as high quality reduces the expected 
willingness to pay for uncertified high quality, due to a reduction of consumers' trust on 
uncertified products. This uncertainty on firms' quality claims results in an 
extraordinary price premium for certified products beyond their certification costs. This 
result is summarized next. 
Result 4. When the low quality version is available to consumers, the 
coexistence of fraud and certification induces a differentiation premium below the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  The first result is due to the fact that p!! − p!! = 1 −∝∗ !/! − 1 p!! + h and ∝∗< 1, which 
implies 1 −∝∗ !/! − 1 < 0  and p!! − p!! < h . Regarding the second result, p!! − p!! = 1 −∝∗ !/! !∝∗ !/! − 1 p!! + c  and   ∝∗< 1 , which implies    1 −∝∗ !/! !∝∗ !/! − 1 > 0  and  p!! − p!! >c  . Clearly, these price premia converge to the respective additional marginal costs, h and c, when the 
number of firms in the industry is large enough. 
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marginal production cost of high quality, and a certification premium above the 
marginal certification cost. 
Finally, we compare the social welfare levels obtained under the three different 
ranges for the fines for fraud. In doing so, we consider the sum of consumers’ surpluses 
and firms’ profits. Since producers collect the prices paid by consumers, social welfare 
is the sum of the differences between consumers’ willingness to pay and per-unit 
production (and certification, if applicable) costs.  
The only possible heterogeneous equilibrium configuration under large fines is 𝐿!𝐻! (see Proposition 1 and Figure 3c). In this equilibrium, consumers with additional 
willingness to pay for high quality between 0 and ℎ purchase the low quality version, 
while the remaining consumers (those with additional willingness to pay for high 
quality between ℎ and 1) purchase high quality. The total cost of high quality in this 
case is ℎ, since high quality is uncertified. Then, social welfare in this equilibrium can 
be written as follows: 
SW(L!H!) =   θ!! dθ! + (  θ!! + θ! − h)dθ! = θ+ 1− h !2  
In the case of low fines (Proposition 2 and Figure 3a), the only possible 
equilibrium is 𝐿!𝐻! . In this equilibrium, consumers with additional willingness to pay 
for high quality between 0 and ℎ + 𝑐  purchase the low quality version, while the 
remaining consumers (those with additional willingness to pay for high quality between ℎ + 𝑐 and 1) purchase high quality. The cost of high quality in this case is ℎ + 𝑐, since 
high quality must be certified. Then, social welfare in this equilibrium is: 
SW(L!H!) =   θ!!!! dθ! + (  θ!!!! + θ! − h− c)dθ! = θ+ 1− h− c !2  
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A simple comparison of the social welfare evaluations under large and low fines 
lead us to conclude that social welfare is larger in the first case. The reason is very 
simple: high quality production is more expensive under low fines since firms must 
incur in certification costs to outstand consumers’ trust.    
Now we analyze social welfare in the case of intermediate fines (Proposition 3 
and Figure 2). For ease of exposition, we consider a sufficiently large number of firms 
in the industry.17 In that case, equilibria 𝐿!𝐻! , 𝐿!𝐿!𝐻! and 𝐿!𝐿!𝐻!𝐻!  are possible. 
First, the social evaluation of equilibrium 𝐿!𝐻!  under intermediate fines is identical to 
that under small fines, and therefore, smaller than under large fines. 
Second, in equilibrium 𝐿!𝐿!𝐻!, consumers with additional willingness to pay 
for high quality between 0 and !∝∗ purchase the low quality version, while the remaining 
consumers (those with additional willingness to pay for high quality between !∝∗ and 1) 
purchase the product labeled as high quality. The cost of high quality in this case is ℎ, 
since high quality is uncertified, but only a proportion ∝∗ of all producers marketing the 
product as high quality truly incur the cost. Then, (expected) social welfare in this case 
is: 
SW(L!L!H!) =   θ!/∝∗! dθ! + (  θ!!/∝∗ +∝∗ θ! −∝∗ h)dθ! = θ+∝∗ 1− h/∝∗ !2  
Then, a comparison of SW(L!L!H!) with the social welfare associated to the 
corresponding equilibrium under large fines, SW(L!H!)  , shows that  SW L!H! >SW(L!L!H!) since ∝∗< 1. Thus, social welfare is higher for large fines than for 
intermediate fines. In addition, a comparison of SW(L!L!H!) with the social welfare 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The same results hold when the number of firms is small, but they are more tedious to present, since 
additional equilibria (iv) and (v) characterized in Proposition 3 can exist as well. 
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associated to the corresponding equilibrium for low fines, SW(L!H!), shows that SW L!L!H! > SW(L!H!).18 In sum, for the range of parameter values for which this 
equilibrium exists, the social welfare associated to intermediate fines (where there is 
fraud) lies between the respective evaluations under low and large fines.    
Finally, in equilibrium 𝐿!𝐿!𝐻!𝐻! , consumers with additional willingness to pay 
for high quality between 0 and !∝∗ purchase the low quality version, consumers with 
additional willingness to pay for high quality between !∝∗ and !!!∝∗ purchase uncertified 
high quality, and the remaining consumers (those with additional willingness to pay for 
high quality between !!!∝∗ and 1 purchase the certified high quality version). The cost of 
high quality in this case is ℎ, since high quality is uncertified, but only a proportion ∝∗ 
of all producers marketing the product as high quality truly incur the cost. Then, the 
social welfare evaluation in this case is the following: 
SW(L!L!H!H!)
=   θ!∝∗! dθ! + (  θ!!!∝∗!∝∗ +∝∗ θ! −∝∗ h)dθ! + (  θ!!!!∝∗ + θ! − h− c)dθ! 
= θ+ 12+ c!2 1−∝∗ + h!2 ∝∗ − h− c 
Now, comparing social welfare under large and intermediate fines, it is the case 
that SW L!H! > SW(L!L!H!H!), since c < 1− α∗. Also, comparing social welfare 
under intermediate and low fines, SW L!L!H!H! > SW(L!H!), since 𝑐 > (!!!∗)!!∗ . 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  The reason is that ∝∗ !!!/∝∗ !! > !!!!! !!  is equivalent to (∝∗− h) > ∝∗ !/!(1 − h − c) , which 
implies c > (!! ∝∗ !/!)(!! ∝∗ !/!)∝∗ !/! . This condition holds for any (h, c) for which the equilibrium L!L!H! is 
defined, i.e., h <∝∗ and c > 1 −∝∗. 
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Thus, the social welfare evaluation for intermediate fines also lies in this case between 
the respective evaluations under low and large fines.    
 Thus, the comparison of the respective social welfare levels under the three 
possible scenarios for the fines unveils the following result: 
Result 5. Ceteris paribus, social welfare levels (weakly) increase with the level 
of the fines for fraud.  
The implication of this result is that social welfare is maximized under large 
fines and minimized under low fines. In particular, the scenario of intermediate fraud 
fines, the only one where fraud can arise, results in social welfare levels in between the 
two extreme scenarios for the level of the fines. Thus, for large fines for fraud, not only 
the industry is more strongly investing in CSR efforts, resulting in the positive 
externalities associated to the credence good, but also social welfare is the largest. It is 
important to highlight that this is the scenario in which firms dispense with certification. 
At the minimum, result 5 questions the social desirability of policies that promote third-
party certification as compared to policies that fight the prevalence of fraud.19  
 
5. Conclusions 
The coexistence of conventional production, CSR practices, fraud and certification is 
common in many market settings. In this paper, we have presented an oligopoly model 
of vertical product differentiation that formalizes CSR in settings where firms can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  This analysis abstracts from the potential disutility that consumers might associate to the existence of 
fraud in the industry. Yet, given that both for the scenarios of large and low fines for fraud no firm 
engages in fraudulent marketing, it would still be the case that social welfare would be maximized under 
large fines for fraud. Considering a disutility associated to the existence of fraud would potentially change 




choose to certify their responsible behavior to outstand in credibility with respect to 
other firms that truthfully (or not) claim to be socially responsible. We have treated 
CSR as a high quality version of a product, while conventional production has 
represented the low quality version. Thus, the model is equally applicable to a broad 
range of CSR practices, such as employment discrimination, "fair trade", respect for 
human rights, use of pesticides, genetically modified organism, and other contexts 
where high quality presents attributes of a credence good.  
The model presents a broader strategy set for firms than those previously 
discussed in the literature in an integrated framework of analysis. First, firms can 
market themselves as responsible, even if they are not. This opens up for fraudulent 
marketing by firms, falsely claiming to be socially responsible. Second, firms' CSR 
strategies can include, but are not restricted to, certification. Thus, firms can choose to 
market their products as conventional, self-reported CSR, or certified CSR. And third, 
consumers hold endogenous beliefs on the prevalence of fraud in the industry and in 
equilibrium these expectations are correct.  
Our results show that the interaction between the possible presence of fraud and 
certification critically alters market structure. We have found that increasing fines for 
fraud extends the likelihood of firms supplying CSR production, at the expense of a 
decreased likelihood of certification. Interestingly, the potential for fraud does not 
prevent the co-existence of fraudulent and honest CSR efforts. In fact, as fraud 
regulation and control increases (inducing in turn higher consumers’ trust on firms’ self-
reported claims), the range of parameter values for which firms voluntary invest in CSR 
increases and so does the equilibrium number of firms that engage in CSR. Certification 
becomes a less likely strategy, whereas producing uncertified CSR is a more likely 
strategy, over-compensating the reduced likelihood of certified efforts. Thus, an 
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interesting implication of this first result is that it is not necessarily the case that 
widespread certification is synonymous of a more responsible industry.  
A relevant finding of our study is that fraud only arises in settings with 
intermediate fines for fraud and where conventional and uncertified CSR production 
coexist in the market. The key aspect for the emergence of fraud is consumers’ 
imperfect trust on the uncertified variety. Interestingly though, with low fines for fraud 
consumers can anticipate that all self-reports on CSR practices that are not third-party 
certified will be fraudulent. Thus, fraud is deterred through low trust on these claims.  
Importantly, the existence of fraud comes at a cost for producers. Fraud induces 
(weakly) lower equilibrium prices of the different varieties than those when there is no 
fraud. Also, the coexistence of fraud and certification induces a differentiation premium 
below the marginal production cost of CSR, and a certification premium above the 
marginal certification cost. The former results from the strategic interaction between 
fraudulent and truthful firms that reduces the expected willingness to pay for uncertified 
CSR. As a result, firms that incur in fraud have higher actual profit margins than the 
firms that truthfully reveal their CSR investments but do not certify so. The latter also 
derives from consumers' uncertainty, providing an extra price premium for the certified 
version. Lastly, our results also shed light on the welfare implications of fraud. Social 
welfare (weakly) increases with increasing fines for fraud.  
In sum, our findings support that policies fighting fraudulent CSR marketing 
simultaneously increase social welfare and guarantee the highest social responsibility of 
the industry supported by voluntary action. Yet, in many instances, governments behave 
as if adherence to certification programs was a socially desirable objective, as shown by 
the provision of direct and indirect subsidies for firms to become more responsible and 
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join certifications. In light of our results, markets where certification is widespread are 
not necessarily those where production is more responsible, because this is mainly 
needed in contexts where consumers do not trust firms’ claims (i.e., contexts of low or 
intermediate fines for fraud). The need to invest in the extra-costs of certification, as 
compared to only investing in socially enhancing responsible production, compromises 
the overall social welfare outcomes.  
It is worth noting that we have conducted our analysis assuming that fraud can 
only be associated to firms' uncertified CSR claims. Thus, we have assumed throughout 
that certification eliminates the asymmetric information problem of consumers, 
providing a true signal of a product quality. An interesting area for further research 
would be to allow for fraud also in the use of the certification. This would require a 
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Proof of Proposition 1. If 𝑓 > ℎ, no firm producing the low quality version has 
incentives to falsely market the product as high quality. Consistently, consumers believe 
that the uncertified firms that claim to offer the high quality version do so truthfully, 
i.e., α∗ = 1.  
Consumer j’s surplus associated with the low, high and certified high quality 
versions of the product when ∝∗= 1 are respectively 𝜃 − 𝑝!!;     𝜃 + 𝜃! − 𝑝!!;   𝜃 + 𝜃! −𝑝!! . First note that the (expected) willingness to pay for the uncertified and certified 
high quality varieties coincide. As a result, no firm offering the high quality version has 
incentives to certify the product in equilibrium. Thus, only the low and uncertified high 
quality versions of the product are supplied, and the expression for the indifferent 
consumer between buying any of the two varieties is 𝜃! = 𝑝!! − 𝑝!! . Therefore, 𝑄! = 𝑝!! − 𝑝!!; is the aggregate demand for the low quality variety while 𝑄! = 1−𝑝!! + 𝑝!! is the demand for the uncertified high quality version of the product. 
Firms first decide their production and marketing strategies (in this case, either 
producing low quality and marketing it as low quality, or producing high quality and 
marketing it as uncertified high quality) and then they compete in quantities. Starting 
with the last stage, a low quality firm (denoted with subscript 𝑏𝑖) selects the quantity so 
as to maximize individual profits as follows: 
max!!! 𝜋!! = 𝑞!!𝑝!!, where 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! − 𝑄!. 
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Since all firms offering the low quality version are equal, the first order 
condition of the maximization problem can be written as 𝑞!! = !!!!!!!!. Substituting this 
into the demand function leads to the best response price 𝑝!! = !!!!!!!!. 
Similarly, a firm offering the uncertified high quality variety selects the quantity 
supplied that maximize individual profits:  
max!!! 𝜋!! = 𝑞!!(𝑝!! − ℎ), where 𝑝!! = 1+ 𝑝!! − 𝑄!. 
Now, the first order condition of the maximization problem can be written as 𝑞!! = !!!!!!!!!!!! . Substituting this into the corresponding aggregate demand function 
results the best response price 𝑝!! = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! . 
As a result, the unique equilibrium is the solution of the two (best response) 
equations, 𝑝!! = !!!!!!!!  and 𝑝!! = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! . This results in equilibrium prices 
conditional on the number of firms following each strategy, as follows: 
𝑝!!|(𝑛!! ,𝑛!!) = !!!!!!!!!!! (!!!!!)!! ;  𝑝!!|(𝑛!! ,𝑛!!) = 𝑛!! + 1 !!!!!!!!!!! (!!!!!)!!. 
Now, to obtain the number of firms in equilibrium following each strategy we 
impose the condition that in equilibrium 𝜋!! = 𝜋!!, so that no firm has incentives to 
deviate to the other possible strategy. Substituting the equilibrium prices conditional on 
quantities in the profit function for low quality firms, 𝜋!! = 𝑞!!𝑝!! , results in the 
expression 𝜋!! = !!!!!! !!!!!! (!!!!!)!! !. Similarly, the profit function of a firm offering 
the uncertified high quality variety results in 𝜋!! = !!!!!!!!!! !!!!!! (!!!!!)!! !. Therefore, the 
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equilibrium condition 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! holds as long as 1+ ℎ𝑛!! = 𝑛!! + 1− ℎ𝑛!!, which 
results in equilibrium numbers of firms 𝑛!! = ℎ𝑁;   𝑛!! = 1 − ℎ 𝑁.    Substituting these 
results into the equilibrium prices conditional on the number of firms obtained above, 
we obtain the equilibrium prices  𝑝!! = 1𝑁; 𝑝!! = 1𝑁 + ℎ. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Since 𝑓 < ℎ, consumers’ equilibrium belief is 0, and only low 
and certified high quality firms coexist in the market. The cost of offering high quality 
is now ℎ + 𝑐 instead of ℎ. The rest of the proof is analogous to that of Proposition 1 
and, therefore, omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 3. If ℎ = 𝑓, any ∝∗∈ 0,1  can be an equilibrium belief, and this 
allows for all the possible types of heterogeneous equilibrium configurations to exist.  
(i). Only low and certified high quality are offered in equilibrium. The 
equilibrium belief ∝∗∈ 0,1  is off the equilibrium path and the result is the same as that 
found under Proposition 2. 
(ii). Only low and uncertified high quality are offered in equilibrium. In this 
case, given consumers’ equilibrium belief ∝∗∈ 0,1 , the same proportion ∝∗of firms 
labeling the product as of high quality are truly producing high quality. Since 
consumers cannot distinguish between true and fake high quality, the equilibrium price 
in both cases is the same, i.e., 𝑝!! = 𝑝!!. Following a similar procedure to that of 
Proposition 1, we first obtain the corresponding best response prices resulting from the 
interaction of low and uncertified high quality firms. Now, the demand for the low 
quality variety is 𝑄! = !!!!!!!∝∗ , and the best response price of the low quality firms is 𝑝!! = !!!!!!!!. Then, the demand for uncertified high quality is now 𝑄! = 1− !!!!!!!∝∗ , 
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which results in the best response price 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = ∝∗!!!!!!!!!!!!!! . Combining both 
reaction functions, we obtain  𝑝!! = ∝∗!!  (  !!!!!!!)(!!!!!)(!!!!!!!!!)!! ; 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = (!!!!!)(∝∗!!  (  !!!!!!!))(!!!!!)(!!!!!!!!!)!!  , which results in the corresponding profit 
functions   𝜋!! = ∝∗!!  (  !!!!!!!) !∝∗ (!!!!!)(!!!!!!!!!)!! !; 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! = !!!!! ∝∗!!!!! !∝∗ (!!!!!)(!!!!!!!!!)!! !. 
Imposing the equilibrium condition 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! = 𝜋!!  and since 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! +𝑛!! = 𝑁 and 𝑛!! =∝∗ n!! + n!! , we obtain that the numbers of firms following the 
respective strategies in equilibrium are, respectively, n!! = hN∝∗, n!! = (1−∝∗) ∝∗−h N∝∗  and n!! = ∝∗− h N, which result in the equilibrium prices 𝑝!! = ∝∗𝑁 , 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = ∝∗𝑁 + ℎ.  
(iii). Low, uncertified and certified high quality are offered in equilibrium. In 
this case, given consumers’ equilibrium belief ∝∗∈ 0,1 , the same proportion ∝∗of 
firms labeling the product as of uncertified high quality are truly producing high quality. 
Since consumers cannot distinguish between true and fake uncertified high quality, the 
equilibrium price in both cases is the same, i.e., 𝑝!! = 𝑝!!. Now, the corresponding 
expressions for consumers’ surpluses with the low, high and certified high quality 
versions of the product for ∝∗∈ (0,1) are respectively 𝜃 − 𝑝!!;     𝜃 + 𝛼∗𝜃! − 𝑝!!;;   𝜃 +𝜃! − 𝑝!! . Therefore, the aggregate demands for the respective varieties of the product 
are the following: 
𝑄! = !!!!!!!∝∗ ; 𝑄! = !!!!!!!!!∝∗ − !!!!!!!∝∗ ; 𝑄! = 1− !!!!!!!!!∝∗ .   
Firms first decide their environmental strategy and then they compete in 
quantities. Starting with the last stage, a firm producing and marketing the product as 
low quality selects the quantity so as to maximize profits, as follows: 
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max!!! 𝜋!! = 𝑞!!𝑝!!, where 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! −∝∗ 𝑄!. 
 
Since all firms are equal, the first order condition of the maximization problem 
can be written as 𝑞!! = !!!∝∗ !!!!! . Substituting this into the demand function leads to the 
best response price 𝑝!! = !!!!!!!!. Thus, 𝑞!! = !!!∝∗ , which results in 𝜋!! = !!!!∝∗ .  
Similarly, honest (and also fake) firms offering uncertified high quality select 
the quantity that maximizes individual profits as follows:  
max!!! 𝜋!! = 𝑞!!(𝑝!! − ℎ),  (max!!! 𝜋!! = 𝑞!!(𝑝!! − 𝑓)) 
where 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! =∝∗ 𝑝!! + 1−∝∗ 𝑝!! −∝∗ 1−∝∗ 𝑄! 
Since all firms selecting each strategy are equal, 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! and ℎ = 𝑓, the first 
order condition of the maximization problem can be written as 𝑞!! = 𝑞!! = ∝∗!!!! !!∝∗ !!!!!∝∗ !!∝∗ (!!!!!!!!!). Substituting this into the corresponding aggregate 
demand function leads to the best response price 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = ∝∗!!!! !!∝∗ !!!!!(!!!!!!!)!!!!!!!!! . Then, 𝑞!! = 𝑞!! = !!!!!∝∗ !!∝∗ , which results 
in 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! = !!!!! !∝∗ !!∝∗ . 
Finally, a firm offering certified high quality selects the quantity supplied that 
maximizes individual profits as follows:  
max!!! = 𝑞!!(𝑝!! − ℎ − 𝑐), where𝑝!! = 1−∝∗+ 𝑝!! − 1−∝∗ 𝑄! . 
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Since all firms selecting this strategy are equal, the first order condition of the 
maximization problem can be written as 𝑞!! = !!∝∗!!!!!!!!!!∝∗ (!!!!!) . Substituting this into the 
corresponding aggregate demand function leads to the best response price 𝑝!! =
!!∝∗!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!  . This results in 𝑞!! = !!!!!!!!!∝∗ 	  and	  𝜋!! = !!!!!!! !!!∝∗ . 
The respective numbers of firms in equilibrium are obtained by imposing the 
condition 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! . Since 𝜋!! = !!!!∝∗ , 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! = !!!!! !∝∗ !!∝∗  and 
𝜋!! = !!!!!!! !!!∝∗ , the conditions 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = 1−∝∗ !/!𝑝!! + ℎ , 𝑝!! = !!∝∗∝∗ !/! 𝑝!! + ℎ + 𝑐  and 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! = 𝑁  must hold in 
equilibrium. 
We use the best  responses 𝑝!! = !!!!!!!! , 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = ∝∗!!!! !!∝∗ !!!!!(!!!!!!!)!!!!!!!!!  and 𝑝!! = !!∝∗!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!! , combined 
with the three equilibrium conditions 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = 1−∝∗ !/!𝑝!! + ℎ , 𝑝!! =
!!∝∗∝∗ !/! 𝑝!! + ℎ + 𝑐 , 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! = 𝑁 and 𝑛!! =∝∗ (𝑛!! + 𝑛!!)   to 
obtain the corresponding equilibrium prices an numbers of firms following each 
strategy. 
First, combining 𝑝!! = !!!!!!!!  and 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = 1−∝∗ !/!𝑝!! + ℎ , results in 𝑝!! = !!!!!!! !!∝∗ !/!, which leads to 𝑛!! = !!!! + 1−∝∗ !/! − 1. 
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Second, combining 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = ∝∗!!!! !!∝∗ !!!!!(!!!!!!!)!!!!!!!!! , 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! =1−∝∗ !/!𝑝!! + ℎ  and 𝑝!! = !!∝∗∝∗ !/! 𝑝!! + ℎ + 𝑐  results in 𝑝!! = ∝∗ !!! !!!!∝∗ !/! !!!!!!!!! !(∝∗)!/! !!∝∗ !/!! !!∝∗ , which leads to 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! =∝∗ !!! !!!!! !!∝∗ !/! + (∝∗)!/! + 1−∝∗ !/! − 1.  
Finally, combining 𝑝!! = !!∝∗!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!  with 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = 1−∝∗ !/!𝑝!! + ℎ  and 𝑝!! = !!∝∗∝∗ !/! 𝑝!! + ℎ + 𝑐 , results 
in𝑝!! = ∝∗!!∝∗ !/! !!∝∗!!!!!!!!(∝∗)!/!, which leads to 𝑛!! = (∝∗)!/!(!!∝∗!!)!!! !!∝∗ !/! + (∝∗)!/! − 1. 
Now, by imposing the condition 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! = 𝑁, the equilibrium 
price of the low quality version is 𝑝!! = ! !!∝∗ !/!!∝∗!! !! ∝∗!(∝∗)!/! !(∝∗)!/! !!∝∗!!∝∗ !/!∙ !!!!! !!∝∗ !/!!(∝∗)!/! , and the 
remaining equilibrium prices and number of firms following each strategy can be easily 
obtained substituting this expression in the above equations.  
(iv). Only uncertified high quality is offered in equilibrium. In this case, given 
consumers’ equilibrium belief ∝∗∈ 0,1 , the same proportion ∝∗of firms labeling the 
product as of uncertified high quality are truly producing high quality. The equilibrium 
price in this case is the same as the one obtained in the following case, since this case is 
a limiting situation of coexistence of uncertified and certified high quality, when the 
mumber of firms following the latter strategy tends to zero.   
(v). Only uncertified and high quality are offered in equilibrium. In this case, 
given consumers’ equilibrium belief ∝∗∈ 0,1 , the same proportion ∝∗of firms labeling 
the product as of uncertified high quality are truly producing high quality. The 
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corresponding expressions for the expected consumer’s surpluses for uncertified and 
certified high quality are 𝜃 + 𝛼∗𝜃! − 𝑝!!;;   𝜃 + 𝜃! − 𝑝!! , from which the aggregate 
demand for uncertified high quality is 𝑄! = !!!!!!!!!!∗ , which results in the best response 
price for uncertified high quality 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = !!!!!(!!!!!!!)!!!!!!!!! . Then, the aggregate 
demand for certified high quality is 𝑄!! = 1− !!!!!!!!!!∗ , which results in the best 
response price 𝑝!! = !!∝∗!!!!!!!!(!!!)!!!!! . Combining both reaction functions, we obtain  𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = !!∝∗!!!! !!! !!(!!!!!!!)(!!!!!)(!!!!!!!!!)(!!!!!)!! ; 𝑝!! = (!!∝∗)(!!!!!!!!!)!!!!(!!!!!!!!!) !!! !!(!!!!!!!)(!!!!!!!!!)(!!!!!)!!  , which results in the 
corresponding profit functions   𝜋!! = 𝜋!! = !!∝∗!!!!! !(!!∝∗) (!!!!!!!!!)(!!!!!)!! ! ; 𝜋!! =
(!!∝∗) !!!!!!!!! !!(!!!!!!!) !(!!∝∗) (!!!!!!!!!)(!!!!!)!! ! . 
Imposing the equilibrium condition   𝜋!! = 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! and using the fact that 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! + 𝑛!! = 𝑁  and 𝑛!! =∝∗ (𝑛!! + 𝑛!!)  we obtain that the equilibrium 
numbers of firms following each strategy are 𝑛!! = 𝑐𝑁, 𝑛!! = ∝∗!"!!∝∗ and 𝑛!! = !!∝∗!! !!!∝∗ , 
which result in the equilibrium prices 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! = !!∝∗! + ℎ,𝑝!! = !!∝∗! + ℎ + 𝑐. 
Existence of the different equilibrium configurations of Proposition 3. 
Here, we explore the conditions for the existence of each type of equilibrium 
characterized in Proposition 3 (and illustrated in Figure 1).  
We first explore the conditions for the existence of the LLLHHHHC equilibrium 
(case iii in Proposition 3). These conditions derive from the relative positions of the 
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indifferent consumers between purchasing low and uncertified high quality on the one 
hand, and uncertified and certified high quality on the other hand, in the interval [0,1]. 
That is, the existence of this equilibrium is guaranteed as long as there exists a subset of 
consumers purchasing each variety of the product. Thus, this equilibrium exists 
whenever 0 < !!!!!!!∝∗ < !!!!!!!!!∝∗ < 1.  
We first analyze the condition 0 < !!!!!!!∝∗ . Substituting the equilibrium values 
for 𝑝!! and 𝑝!! presented in part (iii) of Proposition 3, we obtain: 
ℎ 1− !! !!∝∗ !/! !!!!!! !!∝∗ !/!!(∝∗)!/! + 𝑐 !!∝∗ !/!!! [∝∗!(∝∗)!/!]!!∝∗ !/!∙ !!!!! !!∝∗ !/!!(∝∗)!/! +
!!∝∗ !/!!! (∝∗)!/! !!∝∗ !/!!!!!! !!∝∗ !/!!(∝∗)!/! > 0.  
The term that accompanies ℎ is positive and the term that accompanies 𝑐 is also 
positive. Under equality, this condition then defines a linear negative relationship 
between ℎ and 𝑐, namely 𝜃!" = 0 in Figure 1. The vertical intercept of this linear 
relationship (i.e., the value of 𝑐 when ℎ = 0) is !!∝∗!!(∝∗)!/! > 0. Note that this condition is 
not satisfied for ℎ and 𝑐 sufficiently small, in particular, it is not satisfied for ℎ = 𝑐 = 0. 
Second, we analyze the condition 
!!!!!!!!!∝∗ < 1. Substituting the corresponding 
equilibrium expressions for 𝑝!!, 𝑝!!and 𝑝!!  presented in part (iii) of Proposition 3, we 
obtain the condition: 
ℎ !(∝∗)!/! − 1 1−∝∗ !/! +∝∗− 1𝑁 + 3− 2 1−∝∗ !/! + (∝∗)!/! + 𝑐 !(∝∗)!/! − 1 ∝∗− (∝∗)!/!𝑁 + 3− 2 1−∝∗ !/! + (∝∗)!/! + 1
< 1−∝∗ 1− 1− (∝∗)!/!𝑁 + 3− 2 1−∝∗ !/! + (∝∗)!/!  
45	  
	  
Under equality, a negative linear relationship between ℎ and 𝑐 is established, 
since the term that accompanies ℎ is clearly positive, while the term that accompanies 𝑐 
is positive as well (the first term of the expression in brackets is negative but smaller 
than one in absolute value). This linear relationship is represented by the label 𝜃!" = 1 
in Figure 1. The vertical intercept of this relationship (i.e., the value of 𝑐 when ℎ = 0) in 
this case is 
!! !!(∝∗)!/!!!!!! !!∝∗ !/!!(∝∗)!/! (!!∝∗)
!! !!(∝∗)!/! !!!!!! !!∝∗ !/!!(∝∗)!/! > !!∝∗!!(∝∗)!/!. 
Finally, condition 
!!!!!!!∝∗ < !!!!!!!!!∝∗ results in: 
ℎ∝∗ 1− 1−∝∗ !/! − (∝∗)!/! 1−∝∗ !/! +∝∗− 11−∝∗ 𝑁 + 3− 2 1−∝∗ !/! + (∝∗)!/! + 1
+ 𝑐1−∝∗ 1− 1−∝∗ !/! − (∝∗)!/! ∝∗− (∝∗)!/!∝∗ 𝑁 + 3− 2 1−∝∗ !/! + (∝∗)!/! − 1
+ 1− 1−∝∗ !/! − (∝∗)!/!(∝∗)!/! 𝑁 + 3− 2 1−∝∗ !/! + (∝∗)!/! < 0 
Under equality, a positive linear relationship is established between ℎ and 𝑐 
(which is labeled as 𝜃!" = 𝜃!"  in Figure 1), since the term that accompanies ℎ is 
positive (the first term in brackets is negative, but it is surely lower than one in absolute 
value), while the term that accompanies 𝑐 is negative as well (the first term in brackets 
is negative, and it is surely smaller than one in absolute value). 
As a result of the combination of the three conditions 𝜃!" > 0, 𝜃!" < 1 and 𝜃!" < 𝜃!" , for any ∝∗∈ 0,1 , there always exist a set of parameters for (ℎ, 𝑐) such 
that equilibrium LLLHHHHC exists. The size of this range of parameters depends on 
consumers’ equilibrium belief, ∝∗, and the total number of firms. When one or more of 
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the three conditions for the existence of this equilibrium are not satisfied, the system 
results in any of the other four possibilities stated in Proposition 3.  
For example, if 𝜃!" ≥ 1, equilibrium LLLHHH emerges, see Figure 1. The 
equilibrium prices and the number of firms in equilibrium in this case are presented in 
part (ii) of Proposition 3. Thus, for this equilibrium to exist, condition 𝜃!" ≥ 1 needs to 
hold and also condition 0 < 𝑛! < 𝑁, i = 𝐿! , 𝐿! ,𝐻!, which is satisfied as long as ℎ <∝∗. 
Otherwise, only the low quality version of the product is offered in the market.  Thus, 
conditions 𝜃!" ≥ 1  and ℎ <∝∗  jointly characterize the existence of equilibrium 
LLLHHH.  
When 𝜃!" ≥ 𝜃!" , only the low and the certified high quality versions of the 
product can coexist in equilibrium (equilibrium LLHC, see Figure 1), as characterized in 
part (i) of Result 3. Therefore, for this equilibrium to exist, condition 𝜃!" ≥ 𝜃!"  needs 
to hold and also condition 0 < 𝑛! < 𝑁 , i = 𝐿! ,𝐻! , which is satisfied as long as ℎ + 𝑐 < 1. Otherwise, only the low quality version of the product is offered in the 
market. Therefore, conditions 𝜃!" ≥ 𝜃!"  and ℎ + 𝑐 < 1  jointly characterize the 
existence of equilibrium LLHC.  
Finally, when 𝜃!" ≤ 0 , only the uncertified and the certified high quality 
versions of the product can coexist (equilibria LHHH and LHHHHC, see Figure 1), with 
corresponding equilibrium characteristics given in parts (iv) and (v) of Proposition 3, 
respectively. The existence of equilibrium LHHHHC is guaranteed as long as 𝜃!" ≤ 0 
and 𝑐 < 1−∝∗. By contrast, equilibrium LHHH emerges if 𝜃!" ≤ 0 and 𝑐 < 1−∝∗. 
Proof of Result 3. Starting with 𝑝!!, note that 𝑝!! = !! under both large and low fines 
for fraud (see Propositions 1 and 2, respectively), and also in case (i) of Proposition 3. 
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In cases (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3 (the only additional cases where the low quality 
version of the product is offered, we respectively have 𝑝!! = ∝∗! < !! since ∝∗∈ (0,1), 
and 𝑝!! = ! !!∝∗ !/!!∝∗!! !! ∝∗!(∝∗)!/! !(∝∗)!/! !!∝∗!!∝∗ !/!∙ !!!!! !!∝∗ !/!!(∝∗)!/! < !! , since ℎ <∝∗< (∝∗)!/!  in 
area LLLHHHHC (see Figure 1). Note that in cases (iv) and (v), the low quality version is 
produced but marketed as high quality. Nevertheless, 𝑝!! = !!∝∗! + ℎ < !! as well, since 𝑁 > 1 and ℎ <∝∗ in areas LHHH and LHHHHC (see Figure 1). 
Considering now 𝑝!!, note that 𝑝!! = !! + ℎ in the case of high institutional 
quality (Proposition 1). If we observe the cases where this price arises (cases ii-v of 
Proposition 3), we then have 𝑝!! = ∝∗! + ℎ < !! + ℎ (case ii); 𝑝!! = 1−∝∗ !/!𝑝!! +ℎ < 1−∝∗ !/! !! + ℎ < !! + ℎ (case iii); and 𝑝!! = !!∝∗! + ℎ < !! + ℎ (cases iv and v). 
Finally, regarding 𝑝!! , note that 𝑝!! = !! + ℎ + 𝑐  in the case of low fines 
(Proposition 2). If we now look at the cases where this price arises (cases i, iii and v of 


























































Figure 3. Equilibrium configurations for different fines for fraud and small N. Grey areas

























Figure 4. Equilibrium configurations for different fines for fraud and small N. Shadowed areas
represent equilibria with fraud.
